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 In this thesis, we consider a novel denial of service attack targeted at popular smartphone 
operating systems. This type of attack, which we call a Denial of Convenience (DoC) attack, 
prevents non-technical savvy victims from utilizing data services by exploiting the connectivity 
management protocol of smartphones’ operating systems when encountered with a Wi-Fi access 
point. By setting up a fake Wi-Fi access point without Internet access (using simple devices such 
as a laptop), an adversary can prompt a smartphone with enabled Wi-Fi features to automatically 
terminate a valid mobile broadband connection and connect to this fake Wi-Fi access point. This, 
as a result, prevents the targeted smartphone from having any type of Internet connection unless 
the victim is capable of diagnosing the problem and disabling the Wi-Fi features manually. For 
the majority of smartphone users that have little networking knowledge, this can be a challenging 
task. We demonstrate that most current smartphones, including iPhone and Android phones, are 
vulnerable to this DoC attack. To address this attack, we propose implementing a novel Internet-
access validation protocol to validate a Wi-Fi access point by taking advantage of the cellular 
network channel. It first uses the cellular network to send a secret to an Internet validation server, 
and tries to retrieve this secret via the newly established Wi-Fi channel to validate the connection 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Just like cellular phones before them, smartphones are quickly transitioning from being a 
novelty to an essential everyday tool. Having a single device capable of serving as a web 
browser, GPS navigator, portable media player, camera, and mobile phone can be very attractive 
to consumers. With more than half of the smartphone market share, the Android operating 
system is currently the most popular among the general public (Yarow). Unfortunately, as users 
become more dependent upon these devices, so does the interest of people seeking to exploit 
them. In the Android platform, a specific form of a denial of service (DoS) attack, which we call 
a denial of convenience (DoC) attack, can be performed with little technical background on a 
large number of users simultaneously. 
 Launching a DoC attack on the Android operating system can be achieved with relative 
ease. First, the attacker configures a computer as a Wi-Fi access point. Once this is done, the 
attacker makes sure this fake access point is not allowing any data traffic. Finally, the attacker 
deploys the fake access point in a heavily transited place where users are likely to use their 
smartphones. If deployed in a location where Wi-Fi Internet access is expected, such as a café, 
hotel, or airport, the attacker must position the fake access point closer to the victim than the 
legitimate access point to provide a stronger signal. When inside the coverage area of the open 
access point, Android will automatically disconnect from the mobile broadband in order to 
connect to the hotspot. However, because this fake access point does not have any Internet 
connectivity, the victim will be deprived of any form of Internet service. 
 A smartphone being targeted by this attack would display an optimal network connection 
status. Only by manually disabling the Wi-Fi capabilities of the device, would the victim be able 
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return to the mobile broadband and, therefore, regain Internet services. However, with more than 
one third of all US adults currently owning a smart phone (Smith), we cannot expect the average 
user to be able to diagnose this exploit and successfully navigate through its solution. Therefore, 
developing an automated solution to this type of attack is highly desired. 
To handle similar types of connectivity issues, traditional operating systems have 
developed several network awareness mechanisms. Microsoft’s Windows, for instance, uses the 
Network Connectivity Status Indicator (NCSI) feature to verify the validity of an Internet 
connection. NCSI achieves this by sending a validation challenge to a predetermined website and 
comparing its response against the expected result (Appendix). If the validation response 
matches the expected result, the system assumes a valid Internet connection has been established. 
In this thesis, we develop an Android application that implements a similar network awareness 
mechanism. We then test its effectiveness by exposing it to a DoC attack under real conditions. 
Although this type of solution is widely implemented by traditional operating systems, its 
effectiveness against more sophisticated DoC attacks is limited. Its weakness lies on the fact that 
the validation key, the value returned in the validation response, must remain constant. An 
attacker, therefore, can easily fool the mechanism by acquiring the static validation key and 
providing it to the victim when her/his system performs a network awareness test. As a result, 
developing a more robust network awareness feature capable of withstanding this type of attack 
would be favorable. 
In this thesis, we propose a novel solution capable of overcoming this sophisticated DoC attack. 
It achieves this by overcoming the main flaw of the mechanism previously considered: the 
validation key is not a static value.  This, as a result, makes it impossible for an attacker without 
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Internet connectivity to provide the information expected by the device. Thus, prompting the 
smartphone to disconnect from the fake Wi-Fi access point and reconnect to the mobile 
broadband. 
 In short, our thesis makes the following contributions: (i) Exposes a specific type of DoS 
attack that Android’s Wi-Fi protocol is unable to prevent. In addition, demonstrate how it can be 
easily mounted on a large number of victims simultaneously. (ii) Applies a network awareness 
mechanism commonly used by traditional operating systems to prevent this type of exploit. We 
implement this solution in the form of a lightweight application and test it thoroughly under real 
conditions. (iii) Uncovers how this mechanism can be fooled by a more sophisticated version of 
the attack. Furthermore, demonstrate this by implementing an attack that fools the network 
awareness solution. (iv) Proposes a novel solution capable of overcoming the limitations of the 
previously implemented network awareness mechanism. Our solution requires no user 
intervention. Thus, making it especially attractive because of the large number of smartphone 




CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND 
 
 By design, Android smartphones connect to the Internet using only one channel at a time. 
For users with a data plan, this channel is normally their provider’s mobile broadband. However, 
this channel may transition automatically to Wi-Fi if the user enters the coverage area of an 
access point and if the following two conditions are met: (i) the Wi-Fi capabilities of the device 
are enabled and (ii) the access point is open or has been previously accessed. Throughout this 
process, Android’s connectivity manager does not check if the Wi-Fi access point has a 
functioning Internet connection. An attacker, therefore, can prompt a device to disconnect from 
the functioning mobile broadband by establishing a Wi-Fi access point. Then, deprive the victim 
of Internet services by blocking all data traffic through their access point. 
 In order to determine the status of an Internet connection, traditional operating systems 
have developed a variety of network awareness features. Windows, for instance, uses the 
Network Connectivity Status Indicator (NCSI) to achieve this. NCSI verifies that the targeted 
access point has Internet connectivity by performing two simple tests. In the first test, it attempts 
to load a webpage via HTTP through the newly established connection. This page, used solely by 
this Windows feature, only contains the text line “Microsoft NCSI”. If this content is retrieved 
successfully, it assumes the access point is connected to the Internet. In the second test, NCSI 
verifies that the page dns.msftncsi.com resolves to the expected IP address 131.107.255.255. If 




CHAPTER THREE: RELATED WORK 
 
Previous works on smartphone security can be organized into two subjects. The first of 
these subjects is smartphone malware. Many works on this area of study focus on Android 
because its large share of the smartphone market has made it the most attractive mobile platform 
for malware development. In Backes’ and Sastry’s works, the malware is introduced into the 
system by escalating the permissions of a seemingly harmless application (Backes) (Sastry). 
Vidas considers different exploits that can be mounted on Android phones if an application has 
an unnecessary amount of permissions (Vidas). Schmidt demonstrates how the Android 
permission system can be bypassed by introducing malware that uses the native Linux 
applications of the device (Schmidt). Porter proposes a tool that assists developers or users in 
determining whether an app is overprivileged (Porter). Nauman, on the other hand, proposes a 
framework that enhances the default Android permission systems (Nauman). Obviously, these 
works differ from ours in that they do not consider network exploits. 
The second subject of smartphone security research considers the implementation of 
traditional computer exploits and defenses on mobile devices. Because smartphones share many 
characteristics with regular computers, they also share their susceptibility to some widely used 
forms of attacks. Kumar, for example, demonstrates how several port scanning techniques can be 
used on Android to gather information about the device (Kumar). Then, use this information to 
mount different eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle, and denial of service attacks. Portokalidis, on 
the other hand, considers how resource limitations make it problematic or impractical for 
smartphones to use traditional security measures such as file scanners (Portokalidis). To 
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overcome this, it proposes a model that delegates all security checks to a virtual replica of the 
phone hosted on a remote server. 
Currently, there are many works available on rogue access point detection. Several 
enterprise Wi-Fi security systems, for example, rely on lists of authorized access points to detect 
when a rogue access point is introduced into an area (Fluke) (Aruba) (WiMetrics). ETSniffer, on 
the other hand, provides the rogue access point detection capabilities to the end user. By utilizing 
network metrics to detect latencies characteristics of this type of exploits, ETSniffer is able of 
identifying evil-twin access points with a high level of accuracy (Song).  
Our work is different from all previous works because it considers a form of attack 
unique to smartphones. Also, it is able to successfully implement on Android a defense 
mechanism currently employed by tradition operating systems. Finally it proposes a novel 
network awareness feature that relies on the mobile broadband connection of the device to 
provide an attack resistant authentication scheme.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: ATTACKS 
 
4.1 Attack 1: Passive Access Point 
 The first method considered in this thesis for executing a DoC attack is through a Wi-Fi 
access point without an Internet connection. When an Android smartphone enters the coverage 
area of a wireless router, it is automatically assigned an identifier and loaded into the Wi-Fi stack 
of the device. If the phone’s Wi-Fi connectivity options are enabled and the access point is open 
or has been previously accessed, it will automatically connect to it. It will then terminate any 
ongoing mobile broadband connection that might have been established prior to the Wi-Fi 
connection. However, the device does not verify the access point has a functioning Internet 
connection at any time during or after the connectivity process. Therefore, by setting up a Wi-Fi 
access point that is not connected to the Internet, an Android device can be prompted to abandon 
its mobile broadband data connection to establish another one that does not provide any data. 
This, in turn, denies the user of any type of data service. 
 
Figure 1: Real vs. fake AP 
 The DoC attack previously described can be executed in a variety of ways. One simple 
approach is through a wireless router that is not connected to the Internet. This method can be 
implemented with little resources and technical knowledge. Another possible approach is to 
configure a laptop as an access point, which can be achieved by using the free network software 
       
(b) Fake AP (a) Real AP 
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suite aircrack-ng, and making sure it is not allowing any data traffic (d’Otreppe). This approach 
allows the attacker to be unhindered when executing the attack. 
Regardless of the implementation used, this type of attack can be very effective because:  
(i) The attacker has the ability to deny data services to a large number of victims simultaneously. 
(ii) From the victim’s perspective, it is difficult to detect this type of attack because the device 
would display an optimal connection status. That is, Android would show that a Wi-Fi 
connection has been successfully established and that it is working properly. (iii) This type of 
attack can be executed without the use of sophisticated equipment or extensive technical 
expertise. 
4.2 Attack 2: Fake Validation Response 
 A defense against attack 1 can be successfully mounted by implementing network 
awareness features similar to those used by traditional operating systems. These features test the 
Internet connectivity of an access point by sending a challenge to a validation server and 
comparing a key obtained in the response against the expected result (Appendix). For this to 
work (i) the key must be known by the device before performing the validation and (ii) the key 
stored in the validation server must remain constant. However, these conditions allow the 
attacker to obtain the key from the smartphone or the server. And, once the key is known, it can 
be used to the fool the feature by selectively responding to the probing packages at the time of 
validation. 
 In practice, there are a variety of ways in which such attack can be implemented. In this 
thesis, we implement attack 2 by configuring a computer as an access point and redirecting all 
probing packets to a fake validation server. Because Android does not currently support ad-hoc 
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IBSS networks (MIC_888), it is necessary to configure the computer as a full Wi-Fi access point. 
This can be achieved by using aircrack-ng. Then, use the Linux application iptables to redirect 
all probing packages to a local server that mimics the validation server (Russell). 
Using this implementation, the network awareness protocol is able to successfully 
retrieve the key. And, even though the key is retrieved from the attacker’s computer, the access 
point is classified as valid. The connection to the fake Wi-Fi point is maintained, the device does 
not return to the functioning mobile broadband connection, and the victim is deprived of all data 
services. This approach also has the advantage of requiring few resources. Any laptop computer 
with a wireless card and a UNIX/Linux operating system is sufficient to successfully execute this 
attack 2. 
4.3 Attack 3: Selective Internet Traffic Throttling 
A successful defense against attack 2 could be formulated by implementing a challenge-
response mechanism that relies on a dynamic key. That is, the key is different for every 
validation test performed. Even if such defense is possible, an attacker with Internet access could 
defeat it. Just like in the network awareness protocol previously discussed, the smartphone would 
still need to access a server to retrieve a validation key. Therefore, if the attacker has Internet 
access, it could fool the protocol by permitting the probing packets to reach the validation server 
while blocking all other traffic. This would allow the device to successfully retrieve the dynamic 
key. As a result, the device would remain connected to a fake Wi-Fi access point that does not 
allow other forms of traffic, thus successfully executing a DoC attack. 
 There are several ways of implementing this particular type of attack. One possible 
approach is almost identical to our attack 2 implementation. Essentially, it requires configuring a 
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computer as a Wi-Fi access point, redirecting all probing packages to the validation server, and 
blocking all other traffic. This can be achieved by using aircrack-ng and iptables. However, this 
approach requires additional hardware. Two separate network interface cards are needed to 
establish the Wi-Fi access point and to maintain Internet connectivity. However, this additional 
hardware requirement can be easily satisfied by using the computers 10/100/1000 Gigabit 
Ethernet port or an inexpensive USB wireless adapter along with its internal wireless card.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DEFENSES 
 
5.1 Defense Against Attack 1: Static Identifier Validation Protocol 
 In order to counteract attack 1, we implement a network awareness protocol on Android 
in the form of a lightweight app. This app, which we call Wi-Fi Authenticator, automatically 
verifies that Wi-Fi access points have a functioning Internet connection without the need for any 
user intervention. To achieve this, Wi-Fi Authenticator relies on the following two-step process: 
(i) Every time a connection is established with an access point, Wi-Fi Authenticator sends a 
challenge to a validation server. If a response is not obtained within some time period, the access 
point is considered invalid. On the other hand, if a response is received, Wi-Fi Authenticator 
proceeds to step 2 of the validation process. (ii)  Wi-Fi Authenticator retrieves a key from the 
validation response and compares it with a key stored in the device. If the keys match, the access 
point is considered valid. Otherwise, it is considered invalid. Step 2 prevents an attacker from 
easily fooling the authentication protocol by sending an arbitrary response to the challenge. 
If the Wi-Fi access point is considered invalid in either step, Wi-Fi Authenticator 
terminates and disables the connection. This prompts the Android smartphone to transition back 
to a mobile broadband data connection returning data services to the victims. Also, it maintains 
the Wi-Fi capabilities of the device enabled allowing it to connect to other Wi-Fi access points 




Figure 2: Wi-Fi Authenticator validation test 
Implementing Wi-Fi Authenticator as an Android app provides several advantages. It 
allows the use of Android libraries in the development process. Thus, it improves its robustness 
and compatibility across different versions of the operating system. Also, it allows for easy 
distribution to existing smartphones through the use of Google Play. Finally, because it can be 
installed like any other application, it facilitates user implementation. 
5.2 Defense Against Attack 2: Dynamic Identifier Validation Protocol 
 As demonstrated by attack 2, a more sophisticated attacker with greater technical 
knowledge could overcome defense 1. This is primarily due to the fact that the validation key 
used in this method of defense is always constant. In order address this weakness, we propose a 
novel network awareness protocol in which the validation key is dynamic. That is, it changes 




          status 









generate a different key for every validation test it performs. An attacker, therefore, is unable to 
fool the protocol by supplying the expected response because it is not known by them. 
This approach relies on the following five step process to validate a Wi-Fi access point: 
(i) After encountering an accessible Wi-Fi access point, the smartphone generates a random key 
and sends it along with its MAC address to the validation server through the cellular network. 
Depending on the user’s billing agreements, this data can be send as a SMS or TCP package. (ii) 
The validation server stores the random key in a table using the MAC address of the smartphone 
as the index. (iii) After transitioning from the mobile broadband to the Wi-Fi connection, the 
smartphone sends a challenge to the validation server. (iv) The validation server responds with 
the key corresponding to the smartphone’s MAC address. (v) The key obtained from the 
validation response is compared against that generated earlier by the smartphone. If equal, the 
Wi-Fi connection is considered valid. Otherwise, it is considered invalid. 
 Similarly to defense 1, this validation test is performed automatically without the need for 
any user intervention. Also, if a Wi-Fi access point is considered invalid, the connection is 
terminated and disabled. This allows the device to regain Internet services by reconnecting to the 
mobile broadband while maintaining its Wi-Fi capabilities enabled. 
 
      
(a) ID validation with a legitimate AP 
 





Figure 3: Illustration of the dynamic ID validation protocol 
5.3 Defense Against Attack 3: Network Performance Monitoring 
 Given the case in which the attacker has Internet access, defense 2 might not be able to 
counteract attack 3. The effectiveness of defense 2 lies on the fact that the key is not known prior 
to the validation test. As a result, even if the attacker has the ability to intercept the validation 
challenge, it is not able to fool the protocol by returning the correct response.  However, if the 
attacker has an Internet connection, it could execute a successful DoC attack by allowing the 
challenge to reach the validation server and blocking or throttling all other traffic. However, this 
weakness can be eliminated by expanding defense 2 into considering network metrics. Thus, if 
traffic blocking or throttling is occurring, the network awareness feature would measure the 
network performance is below a predetermined threshold. Then, using this information, it would 
regain data services by prompting the smartphone to transition back to the mobile broadband.  
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CHATER SIX: EVALUATION 
 
6.1 Attack 1: Passive Access Point 
In order to simulate a realistic scenario, we implement attack 1 by configuring a Linux 
laptop computer as a Wi-Fi access point. Although attack 1 could be easily implemented by 
using a wireless router without an Internet connection, we believe this particular setup is the 
most effective at simulating a real attack in which mobility is highly desired. Aircrack-ng is used 
to create the fake Wi-Fi access point through the native wireless adapter of the laptop computer. 
In order to prompt the targeted device to connect to our fake access point, we automatically 
assign an IP address to it after entering our coverage area. We achieve this by creating a DHCP 
server using the free Linux package dhcp3-server (dhcp3). When running both of these 
applications combined, we are able to successfully emulate a Wi-Fi access point. 
 We setup our fake Wi-Fi access point in an average sized room outside the coverage area 
of any other Wi-Fi access point. We then enter the room with an Android smartphone that has its 
Wi-Fi capabilities enabled. Finally, we perform an arbitrary Google query using the default 
Google Search app of the device. After erasing the fake access point entry from the Wi-Fi stack 
of the device, we repeat this test 20 times. In all cases, the smartphone connects to the fake 
access point, disconnects from the mobile broadband, and displays the Wi-Fi connection has a 
strong signal. However, at the time of the query, no information is returned nor a notification 




Figure 4: Wi-Fi connection status displayed with attack 1 
6.2 Defense Against Attack 1: Static Identifier Validation Protocol 
 We implement our defense 1 network awareness feature as an Android app which we call 
Wi-Fi Authenticator. Wi-Fi Authenticator tests the connectivity of an access point by accessing a 
website, retrieving its content, and comparing it against a key phrase. This validation scheme is 
performed automatically every time a Wi-Fi connection is established. If Wi-Fi Authenticator is 
unable to access the website or if the content retrieved does not contains the key phrase, the 
access point is considered invalid and disabled. For these tests, we use the default Google page 
as the validation website (74.125.227.1) and the word “google” as the key phrase. 
 To evaluate the performance of defense 1, we execute an experiment very similar to that 
of attack 1. Just like before, we setup a fake access point in an average sized room outside the 
coverage area of any other Wi-Fi access point. We then expose a regular Android smartphone 
with Wi-Fi Authenticator installed to the fake access point. In all cases, Wi-Fi Authenticator is 
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able to determine the Wi-Fi access point is invalid, disconnect from it, and reconnect to the 
mobile broadband. 
 
Figure 5: Detection of invalid AP using Wi-Fi Authenticator 
Wi-Fi Authenticator is able to determine if a Wi-Fi access point is valid almost 
immediately. However, the time it takes for Wi-Fi Authenticator to detect a fake access point 
varies depending on the environment. The following figure shows the validation times for fake 
Wi-Fi access points. Three different devices were used to generate the fake access points in this 
experiment. 










     AP disabled 
Wi-Fi enabled 




Figure 6: Authentication time for a fake Wi-Fi AP 
6.3 Attack 2: Fake Validation Response 
 To implement attack 2, we first create a fake validation server. This is achieved by setting 
up an Apache HTTP Server in the attacker’s Linux laptop computer (McCool). Because Wi-Fi 
Authenticator uses “google” as the key phrase of the validation scheme, our Apache server is 
configured to display the word “google”. Just like in our attack 1 implementation, we configure 
the Linux laptop computer as a Wi-Fi access point using aircrack-ng. Then, we set up a DHCP 
server using dhcp3-server. This automatically assigns IP addresses to smartphones entering the 
coverage area and, thus, prompts them to connect to our fake Wi-Fi access point. Finally, we use 
iptables to redirect all track sent to 74.125.227.1, Google’s homepage, to the IP address of the 
fake Wi-Fi access point network interface. 
 To measure the performance of attack 2, we deploy our attacker’s laptop computer in an 
average sized room outside the coverage area of any other Wi-Fi access point. We then enter the 
room with an Android smartphone that has Wi-Fi Authenticator installed. This test is repeated 20 






















Authentication Time for 
Fake Wi-Fi AP 
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Authenticator is unable to determine the fake Wi-Fi access point is invalid. Thus, the connection 
is preserved and the smartphone is denied Internet connectivity.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this thesis, we have considered a denial of service attack targeted at popular 
smartphone platforms. We present three possible approaches for executing this attack along with 
three defenses capable of counteracting them. We demonstrate, through implementation an 
evaluation, that such attacks are successful at achieving their purpose. Also, we demonstrate how 
each proposed defense is capable of counteracting the different implementations of the attacks. 
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